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CONTRACT LAW’S “TOO GOOD TO BE
TRUE” DOCTRINE—IS IT?
William A. Drennan*
“When [the defendant] accepted the plaintiff’s bid, with knowledge of the
mistake, [the defendant] sought to take an unconscionable advantage of
an inadvertent error. Equity is always prepared to grant relief from such
situations.”1
“If a court should . . . disregard clerical errors, and rearrange words . . . it
is hard to see where the line of demarcation could be drawn and the general effect would inevitably be a condition of chaos and uncertainty.”2
ABSTRACT
In a wonderful variety of emotionally charged contract law opinions,
including the cases of the boastful cheater, the opportunistic attorney, and
the careless concrete contractor,3 courts unfortunately have used the phrase
“too good to be true” as a single-step test to decide enforceability. These
cases can generate emotional responses ranging from empathy4 to schadenfreude5 because they involve a mistake with potentially disastrous results
for one party (and a windfall for the other side). It is understandable that
courts would be drawn to a catchy, down-to-earth phrase to reach a just
resolution in these entertaining and memorable cases.
https://doi.org/10.25172/smulr.75.2.9.
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1. Rushlight Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. City of Portland, 219 P.2d 732, 753 (Or.
1950).
2. United States v. Braunstein, 75 F. Supp. 137, 139–40 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
3. See infra notes 27–41 and accompanying text (regarding the boastful cheater and
the opportunistic attorney); see infra notes 62–73 (regarding the careless concrete
contractor).
4. See, e.g., Rushlight Auto. Sprinkler Co., 219 P.2d at 753 (involving an inadvertent
error by a contractor who promptly admitted the mistake and took remedial action, resulting in no loss or disadvantage to the other side).
5. See, e.g., Meram v. MacDonald, No. 06CV1071-L(AJB), 2006 WL 8456253, at *1
(S.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2006) (involving Rob MacDonald, the multi-millionaire author of the
book Cheat to Win, attempting to weasel out of a promise he made on the grounds that it
was too good to be true).
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Nevertheless, this Article argues that using too good to be true as a single-step test violates fundamental policies of contract law. Judicial toogood-to-be-true pronouncements appear arbitrary and unpredictable,
likely undermining public confidence in the enforceability of contracts.6 As
an alternative, sophisticated, time-tested, multi-factor doctrines are available to achieve just results in these cases.7 Accordingly, this Article argues
that the phrase “too good to be true” should be expunged from the tool kits
of decision-makers and advisors involved in contract disputes.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A

LTHOUGH the phrase “too good to be true” (TGTBT) appears
in many contract cases and other authorities,8 its appropriateness has not previously been the focus of a thorough article. A

6. See infra Section III.A.
7. See infra Sections III.A. & III.B.
8. See, e.g., 2 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A Treatise on the Law of
Contracts § 6:58, at 839 n.12 (4th ed. 2007); 27 id. § 70:111, at 542 n.8, § 70:118, at 579; 1 id.
§ 94 (1936).
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single-step TGTBT test is a tempting,9 fact-based10 device for deciding
challenging contract cases, but courts should resist the temptation. Like
other conclusory-sounding phrases, such as “I know it when I see it,”11 “it
smells fishy,”12 and “otherwise the results would be absurd,”13 the phrase
“too good to be true” appeals to a natural desire to reach a just result for
the parties involved quickly and easily.14 Perhaps it also offers a court a
low risk of reversal on appeal15—and a low risk of influencing future judicial decisions—because each case turns on its particular facts.16
Nevertheless, this Article argues that its use threatens the integrity of
the contract law system. Parties need assurance that their bona fide
agreements will be enforced17 rather than invalidated under an unpredictable doctrine applied by third parties who may not understand the
situation, the history between the parties, and the custom in the trade.
Contract law has its share of other conclusory-sounding phrases that
courts use when deciding cases—and attorneys use when advising clients—such as “it would be unconscionable,”18 “it was a mistake,”19 or
9. See Lange v. United States, 120 F.2d 886, 889 (4th Cir. 1941) (“On the strength of
this single factor [that the price was too good to be true] we would be strongly tempted to
conclude that there was, in fact and law, no real contract . . . .”).
10. Many courts have concluded that whether a proposal was too good to be true is a
question of fact. See, e.g., Portzen Constr. Inc. v. Cal-Co Insulation, Inc., No. 13-0758, 2014
WL 2347821, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. May 29, 2014); Corriveau v. Wash. Mut. Bank, No. A091771, 2010 WL 1966200, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. May 18, 2010); Meram v. MacDonald, No.
060V1071-L(AJB), 2006 WL 8456253, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2006).
11. United States v. Various Articles of Merch., Seizure No. 148, 600 F. Supp. 1383,
1384 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)) (discussing Justice Stewart’s decision not to attempt a definition of “hard-core
pornography,” but stating, “I know it when I see it”).
12. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., No. 2:08-CV-204PS, 2009
WL 1854527, at *18 (N.D. Ind. 2009); see also Alinco Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 373
F.2d 336, 341 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (discussing tax avoidance schemes that “exude an odor
piscatorial”).
13. Ross v. City of Berkeley, No. C-85-7321-MHP, 1986 WL 31688, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 5, 1986).
14. Rushlight Auto. Sprinkler Co. v. City of Portland, 219 P.2d 732, 753 (Or. 1950)
(“[Relief should be granted] in any case where the offeree should know that the terms of
the offer are unintended or misunderstood by the offeror.”).
15. An appellate court generally will only reverse a lower court’s factual determinations if they are contrary to the great weight of the evidence. See, e.g., Riley Bros. Constr.,
Inc. v. Shuck, 704 N.W.2d 197, 205 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005).
16. A judicial holding based on the particular facts and circumstances of the case can
be distinguished, and will not be binding in a subsequent case, as long as the material facts
in the subsequent case are not the same. See CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL &
HARRY G. PRINCE, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW 4–5 (5th ed. 2003) (“If the facts of the
present case do not include a fact that appears to have been necessary (‘material’) to the
earlier decision, the court may ‘distinguish’ the precedent and render a different
decision.”).
17. See infra Section III.A.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. L. INST. 1981); JOSEPH M.
PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 9.39, at 352 (7th ed. 2014) (“[T]he unconscionability concept
has . . . entered the general law of contracts.”).
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 153–54 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (requiring the satisfaction of elements for a contract to be voidable by a mistaken party);
PERILLO, supra note 18, § 9.27, at 337 (“An increasing number of cases have permitted
avoidance where only one party was mistaken.”).
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“the parties did not intend to be bound.”20 But on closer examination,
these are summations of carefully crafted, sophisticated, multi-factor doctrines which are useful parts of the contract law decision-making tool kit.
These doctrines provide meaningful guidance to parties and attorneys
when negotiating, structuring, and drafting contracts, and to the courts
when evaluating whether agreements are legally enforceable. They generally do not leave contract enforcement to mere caprice.
Part II of this Article, for the first time, organizes the TGTBT contract
cases. It creates four categories, and among these, the most disturbing is
the class of cases that treat too good to be true as an independent, singlestep test. Part III explores the conflicting policies that are not discussed in
these cases, but that likely direct the outcomes. The policies for enforcing
these deals include promoting the freedom of contract and fulfilling the
parties’ expectations. On the other hand, the policies for not enforcing
these deals include the equitable concerns involved with excusing honest,
inadvertent mistakes plus not allowing the other party to take an unfair
advantage. Part IV considers the single-step TGTBT cases21 in a new way
and asserts that they could have been decided under the unilateral mistake doctrine (or analyzed as jokes or exaggerations). Part IV also suggests a reformulation of the unilateral mistake doctrine into a multifactor test in which no single factor would be necessary, and a court could
balance various facts, circumstances, and policy concerns to reach a just
result.
II. ORGANIZING THE TGTBT CASES INTO FOUR
CATEGORIES
Courts use the phrase “too good to be true” in contract opinions in at
least four different ways and to address two different types of contract
problems. The two types of contract problems are (i) whether an offer has
been made—a court may say that if the proposal was “too good to be
true” it was not an acceptable offer—or (ii) whether an agreement is an
enforceable contract—if the agreement was “too good to be true” for one
of the parties, then the court may rescind the deal.22
Of the four ways courts use the phrase “too good to be true,” the first
and most disturbing, and the primary focus of this Article, is as a single20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“[A] manifestation of intention that a promise shall not affect legal relations may prevent the formation of a contract.”); PERILLO, supra note 18, § 2.4, at 28 (“[I]f . . . it appears that the
parties do not intend to be bound or do not intend legal consequences, then, under the
great majority of the cases, there is no contract.”).
21. See, e.g., Sumerel v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 232 P.3d 128, 134 (Colo. App.
2009) (discussing the “‘well-settled rule’ that ‘an offeree may not snap up an offer that is
on its face manifestly too good to be true.’”); see also infra Sections III.A, III.B.
22. 1 TIMOTHY MURRAY, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 4.9, at 781 (rev. ed. 1993) (“At
times . . . the mistake will prevent the formation of a contract. At other times, the mistake
will be grounds for avoidance of the contract.”); see, e.g., Sumerel, 232 P.3d at 134–35
(stating alternatively that (i) there was no offer that could be accepted, or (ii) if there was
an agreement, it could be rescinded and therefore was unenforceable).
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step test to decide whether there was a binding contract under the particular facts and circumstances.23 Second, courts may fold TGTBT language
into their applications of the unilateral mistake doctrine.24 While the
TGTBT discussion in these types of cases may appear to bolster the arguments, it is unnecessary. Third, courts may talk about the terms being too
good to be true as part of a discussion about whether the parties were
joking or under some contract law doctrine other than unilateral mistake.25 Again, in these cases, the TGTBT language is extraneous, likely
providing emphasis or mere linguistic flair. Fourth, the phrase may be
used to merely summarize the facts or the results of the case, without any
link to a legal doctrine—in these situations, the phrase does no harm, but
may be confused with the other possible uses.26
A. CATEGORY #1: TGTBT

AS A

SINGLE-STEP TEST

An example of a court using too good to be true as a single-step test is
the case of the boastful cheater.27 Multi-millionaire Rob MacDonald, the
author of Cheat to Win, joined with Allianz Life Insurance Company to
host seminars for financial planners.28 They designed the seminars to encourage the attendees to sell Allianz financial products.29 MacDonald began his presentation telling the audience that one attendee, who placed
his or her business card in a basket and stayed until the end, would “walk
out of here with a million dollars today.”30 MacDonald repeated the
terms at least once more during the presentation.31 At the end, MacDonald pulled Frank Meram’s name out of the basket, and after Meram came
onstage to receive the prize, MacDonald announced that Meram was entitled to one dollar per year for one million years.32 MacDonald prepaid
the award for the first one hundred years by giving Meram $100 in cash.33
“MacDonald then laughed and thanked everyone for attending.”34
Meram felt humiliated in front of his peers and sued for breach of contract, saying he had accepted MacDonald’s offer by depositing his business card in the basket and staying until the end.35
MacDonald argued that his promise to pay one million dollars was too
good to be true and, therefore, could not be the basis for a contract.36 As
the case considered a motion for summary judgment, the court needed to
23. See infra Section II.A.
24. See infra Section II.B.
25. See infra Section II.C.
26. See infra Section II.D.
27. See Meram v. MacDonald, No. 06CV1071-L(AJB), 2006 WL 8456253 (S.D. Cal.
Oct. 23, 2006).
28. See id. at *1.
29. See id. at *6.
30. Id. at *2.
31. See id.
32. See id. at *1.
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. See id. at *5.
36. See id. at *3.
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decide only that it was not an “unescapable conclusion”37 that MacDonald did not mean what he said.38 Although denying MacDonald’s request
for summary judgment, the court concluded that a defense could exist if
the offer was too good to be true (or a joke), thus treating too good to be
true as a separate legal test.39 The court also stated, “Whether a person
could reasonably conclude that a contract would result if he or she accepted . . . is a question to be determined by the trier of fact.”40 In some
situations, the job of applying a vague test is given to the judge, rather
than the jury, to provide “considerable restraint” resulting in “reasonable
application.”41 Thus, this court treated too good to be true as an independent, single-step test that could absolve MacDonald, and it left the job of
applying that test to the jury.
In Speckel v. Perkins, a case of an opportunistic attorney, the court
chose a narrow approach to the unilateral mistake doctrine and wholeheartedly endorsed an independent, single-step TGTBT test.42 Speckel
was injured in a car accident, and his opportunistic attorney sought to
recover the full policy limit of $50,000 from the other driver’s insurance
company.43 The other side’s attorney dictated a letter stating that
Speckel’s case was not worth the policy limit of $50,000, invited further
negotiations, and intended to offer $15,000 to settle the claim.44 The attorney’s assistant, however, typed “$50,000” as the settlement amount in
the letter instead of “$15,000,” and the attorney failed to review the settlement letter before it was sent.45 Upon receipt, Speckel and his opportunistic attorney promptly mailed an acceptance and sued when the
defendant did not pay $50,000.46
The Minnesota Court of Appeals adopted an extremely narrow view of
unilateral mistake47 and concluded that the mistake excuse was unavaila37. Id.
38. On the other hand, the court acknowledged the following facts supporting
Meram’s argument that the proposal was believable (or at least not too good to be true):
(i) MacDonald was a multi-millionaire (so MacDonald was capable of paying a million
dollars); (ii) Allianz was a billion dollar company; and (iii) MacDonald discussed the terms
twice during the presentation. Id. at *2.
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. KNAPP, CRYSTAL & PRINCE, supra note 16, at 574 (discussing that the unconscionability doctrine is treated as a question of law for the judge to decide); see also Bohne v.
Comput. Assocs. Intercom, Inc., 514 F.3d 141, 144 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Allowing a jury to pass
on the lawfulness of contractual terms could raise serious problems in assuring the stability
and predictability of contractual arrangements.”); Residential Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. Granite
Inv. Grp., 933, 548 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.) (discussing generally that a “[d]esire for
certainty and predictability . . . combined with some distrust of juries, has resulted in”
judges making determinations).
42. Speckel v. Perkins, 364 N.W.2d 890, 891 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 891–92.
46. See id. at 892.
47. There were at least four different tests for contract rescission based on unilateral
mistake under Minnesota law. See Dixon v. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co., No. A12-2183,
2013 WL 2928121, at *2–4 (Minn. Ct. App. June 17, 2013).
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ble.48 The court then quoted a treatise for the existence of an independent TGTBT test.49 In analyzing the facts and summarizing the
inconsistencies within the settlement letter and between the settlement
letter and the prior negotiations, the court concluded the agreement was
too good to be true and could not be enforced.50
Sometimes a court will cast the single-step TGTBT test as a “duty to
inquire” test.51 Despite the thin veil, this is the same decision-making
tool. For example, in Discover Bank v. Blake, which could be called the
case of the six-cents-for-a-dollar deal, the court concluded the deal was
unenforceable because the nonmistaken party failed to inquire if there
was a mistake before accepting.52 Discover Bank obtained a judgment
against Marline Blake for over $10,000.53 Initially, Discover Bank offered
discounts of five percent, four percent, and three percent depending on
how quickly she repaid.54 In a subsequent letter, Discover Bank offered
to settle for (i) $9,360 or (ii) three monthly payments of $206.61—a total
of merely $619.83.55 Promptly upon receipt, Marline Blake notified Discover Bank that she accepted their offer to settle for $619.83 total, and
she enclosed a check in the amount of $206.61 for the first installment
payment.56 A week later, Discover Bank returned the $206.61 check with
a letter stating the $619.83 proposal was a mistake.57
Eventually, Discover Bank sued to rescind the alleged agreement
based on the doctrine of unilateral mistake,58 but the court instead focused on whether the offer to settle for six-cents-on-the-dollar was too
good to be true, in which case the customer would have had a duty to
inquire before accepting.59 The court emphasized the following facts: (i)
the discounts offered by Discover Bank just two weeks earlier were not
nearly as generous (only five percent, four percent, or three percent); (ii)
Discover Bank’s subsequent letter was intrinsically nonsensical as it offered a seven percent discount if she paid immediately in a lump sum, but
the letter offered a ninety-four percent discount if she made three
monthly payments; and (iii) Discover had just obtained the judgment
48. See Speckel, 364 N.W.2d at 893.
49. Id. (citing 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 94
(3d ed. 1957)).
50. See id.
51. See, e.g., id. (mentioning a “duty to inquire” twice); Nelson v. Helgeson Dev. Co.,
No. C8-90-2452, 1991 WL 59812, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (“If Nelson knew . . . that
Hollis was acting on a mistaken belief . . . he had a duty to inquire and to set the record
straight.”); Wender Presses, Inc. v. United States, 343 F.2d 961, 962 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (“[T]here
was nevertheless enough to have reasonably cast upon defendant’s officials the duty to
make inquiry.”).
52. Discover Bank v. Blake, No. 27-CV-16-1265, 2017 WL 3469525, at *3 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2017).
53. See id. at *1.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id. Discover Bank also argued that no contract was formed. Id.
59. See id. at *2.
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against Blake three months earlier and therefore had not been trying to
collect for very long.60 The court concluded there had been no cheap settlement because the offer was too good to be true and Marline Blake did
not inquire.61
As the single-step TGTBT test is a question of fact, decisions can go
the other way—in which case the agreement was not too good to be true,
and the court will enforce it. In what may be described as the case of the
careless concrete contractor, a prime contractor requested bids from subcontractors for the concrete work on a parking lot and road project for
the City of Wahpeton, North Dakota.62 Craig Shuck, a concrete contractor (doing business as Beaver Masonry), submitted a sub-bid for
$537,281, which was the low bid by 24%.63 After the prime contractor
(Riley Brothers Construction) won the prime contract, Riley Brothers
and Craig Shuck finalized their agreement in connection with a subsequent meeting.64 After the meeting, that same evening, Craig Shuck realized his bid was at least $100,000 too low, and he would not be able to
perform.65 Nevertheless, he waited almost two weeks to notify Riley
Brothers Construction that there was a problem.66
The trial court decided that the careless concrete contractor’s sub-bid
was not too good to be true and was an offer that Riley Brothers Construction could accept to create a binding contract.67 On appeal, the court
affirmed the validity of the single-step TGTBT test68 and concluded that
the trial court’s factual determinations were supported by reasonable evidence.69 The court noted (i) the prime contractor “testified that in his
experience, bids for the same work can vary between 25% and 30%, and
60. The district court entered a default judgment against Blake in February of 2016,
and Discover sent the second letter on May 9. See id. at *1.
61. Although her husband telephoned Discover Bank and was told the $619.83 proposal was a mistake and should be ignored, the court did not have sufficient facts to determine whether her husband was acting as her agent. See id.
62. Riley Bros. Constr., Inc. v. Shuck, 704 N.W.2d 197, 199 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005).
63. See id. at 200. The next lowest bid was $771,000. See id.
64. The meeting included several parties involved in the parking lot and road project,
and the careless concrete contractor admitted that he understood that the meeting finalized the arrangements. See id.
65. The careless concrete contractor underbid by more than $100,000 because he assumed he could use eight inch slabs of concrete. Instead, the job specifications called for
concrete slabs that were three feet thick. See id. at 201. The careless concrete contractor
produced the faulty bid, in part, because he had merely reviewed “summary specifications
and ‘bidder’s proposal’ for the concrete work.” Id. at 200. He did not receive the project
blueprints until the meeting when the relationships were finalized. See id. at 200–01.
66. The meeting was on May 22. See id. at 200. That evening, Shuck identified errors of
over $100,000. See id. at 201. Although Shuck talked to a representative of the prime contractor two days later, he did not inform the representative that there was a problem. See
id. He did not inform anyone with the prime contractor about the problem—or that he
would not perform—until June 5. See id.
67. See id. at 201 (“The [district] court also found that [the careless concrete contractor’s] bid was not so disproportionately low as to alert [the prime contractor] that there
might be an error in the bid.” (emphasis added)).
68. See id. at 204.
69. See id. at 205.

2022]

“Too Good to Be True”

281

that he had seen variations as high as 40%”;70 (ii) possible reasons for
variations could include the “contractor’s availability and overhead, the
skill and knowledge of the contractor’s [work] crew, whether the contractor had special machinery, and whether the contractor could obtain
favorable prices on material”;71 (iii) the contractor (Craig Shuck) had
more than fifteen years of experience in the industry;72 and (iv) the bid
was over $500,000.73
A case of a miscommunicating school district is another instance where
the Minnesota appellate courts acknowledged a one-step TGTBT test but
denied relief on the facts.74 The school district hired Mercedes Sheldon as
a high school teacher for the 2009 school year on a probationary contract.75 The school district’s procedures for evaluating probationary
teachers included three classroom observations; following the observations, the school district would provide a summary report including a recommendation of contract renewal or termination.76 Due to a
miscommunication between the school’s assistant principal and the district’s human resources department, the human resources department
placed the renewal of Sheldon’s contract on the school board’s agenda,
without considering the results of the three classroom observations. The
school board authorized a one-year renewal contract for 2010, the school
board chair and clerk both signed the renewal contract, and the next day,
Sheldon signed the contract.77 Two weeks later, after the classroom observations, the school district realized its mistake and issued the summary
report concluding that Sheldon should be terminated as a teacher.78 The
school district refused to honor the signed renewal contract.79
When Sheldon sued, the school district argued that rescission was
proper under the doctrine of unilateral mistake, or alternatively, that the
signed agreement was too good to be true, and Sheldon had a duty to
inquire before she signed the contract.80 After rejecting the unilateral
mistake argument, the court concluded the school district’s offer to renew
was believable, and Sheldon had no duty to inquire.81 The court emphasized the following facts: (i) there was nothing unusual or inconsistent
70. Id. at 204.
71. Id.
72. See id. Accordingly, the prime contractor would not expect the subcontractor to
make a mistake.
73. See id. The high price indicated that this was a substantial project, and the prime
contractor could thus expect greater accuracy on a bid.
74. Sheldon v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 284, No. A10-1186, 2011 WL 1236167, at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2011).
75. Id.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id. at *2.
80. See id.
81. See id. The court adopted a narrow approach to the mistake doctrine, stating that
“unilateral mistake . . . is not a basis for rescission unless there is ambiguity, fraud, misrepresentation, or where the contract may be rescinded without prejudice to the other party.”
Id. (quoting Speckel v. Perkins, 364 N.W.2d 890, 893 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)).
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about the form or language of the written contract—it was all standard;82
(ii) the written contract was properly signed by school district officials;
and (iii) the school district’s handbook for probationary teachers failed to
explicitly state that “renewal decisions concerning probationary teachers
are only made after the completion of the summative report.”83
Also, Wender Presses, Inc. v. United States involved a one-line bid
booboo that inspired a peculiar legal analysis.84 The U.S. government
wished to sell various items of used equipment and prepared a list on
which two items, number thirty-three and number thirty-four, were used
lathes.85 Wender Presses erred—they confused the numbers and mistakenly bid $7,751 for item number thirty-four (instead of item number
thirty-three).86 The U.S. government accepted Wender Presses’ bid on
item number thirty-four.87 When Wender Presses discovered its mistake,
it requested rescission on grounds of mistake.88
Although the parties had an agreement supported by consideration,
the court refused to analyze whether that agreement should be rescinded
under the unilateral mistake doctrine.89 Instead, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims focused on whether the bid failed to be an offer on the
grounds that the government’s contracting officer should have known it
was too good to be true,90 in which case the court said the contracting
officer would have had a “duty to make inquiry.”91
Having chosen this method of analysis, the Court of Claims stated,
“The task of ascertaining what [a government] official in charge of accepting bids ‘should’ have known or suspected is, of course, not always an
easy one.”92 Among the facts the court considered were: (i) the contracting officer had not estimated a fair price for the used lathe in advance;93 (ii) the contracting officer had no “knowledge of previous
purchases of the same or [a] similar article”;94 (iii) the range of bids
(Wender Presses bid $7,751 and the only other bids were $3,441,
$2,429.99, $1,511, and $288);95 and (iv) the difficulty of valuing used machinery.96 The court refused to grant relief for Wender Presses and instead enforced the deal, emphasizing that “[t]here was . . . a wide range
82. See id. at *3.
83. Id. The handbook merely stated that a probationary teacher would receive a “written summative report at the conclusion of all annual observations.” Id.
84. Wender Presses, Inc. v. United States, 343 F.2d 961, 961 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
85. See id. at 963.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 962.
89. See id. at 963.
90. See id. The Court of Claims acknowledged this shift when it stated “no agreement
based on such an offer can then be enforced by the acceptor.” Id.
91. Id. at 962.
92. Id. at 963.
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 964.
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on a percentage basis between [all five of the] bids [and] the difference
between [Wender’s] bid and the second highest [was] less than the differences between some of the other bids” on a percentage basis.97 As the
court concluded the deal was not too good, the government had no duty
to inquire before accepting.98
Thus, even when a court acknowledges a single-step TGTBT test, it will
not always be a winning argument for the mistaken party. Nevertheless,
its continued use will signal that courts have a great deal of discretion in
these cases, making outcomes unpredictable. This can make cases more
difficult to settle, prolong acrimony, and encourage protracted litigation.
B. CATEGORY #2: MIXING TGTBT WITH
DOCTRINE

THE

UNILATERAL MISTAKE

In several cases, a court has described a single-step TGTBT test, but
then applied a multi-step, unilateral mistake test. Courts may consider
some combination of the following elements in granting rescission for a
unilateral mistake: (i) whether the mistake related to a basic assumption
upon which the contract was made; (ii) whether the mistake was material;
(iii) whether the mistaken party bore the risk of the mistake; (iv) whether
enforcing the contract (with the mistake) would be unconscionable or oppressive; (v) whether the other party knew, or had reason to know about
the mistake before accepting; (vi) whether the other party caused (or induced) the mistake;99 (vii) whether rescission would impose a “substantial hardship on the [nonmistaken party], other than loss of bargain”;100
(viii) whether it was a clerical, computational, or other inadvertent error;101 (ix) whether it was a mistake of law;102 (x) the degree of the mistaken party’s negligence;103 and (xi) the presence of ambiguity, fraud, or
misrepresentation.104 One leading commentator has a similar list of thir97. Id.
98. See id.
99. These first six factors are included among the Restatement provisions on unilateral
mistake. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (AM. L. INST. 1981). The RESTATEMENT arguably creates three separate avenues for granting relief for a unilateral mistake. In addition to meeting other requirements, relief is available if (i) “enforcement of
the contract would be unconscionable, or (ii) the other party had reason to know of the
mistake, or (iii) [the other party’s] fault caused the mistake.” Id. Whether the mistaken
party bore the risk of the mistake can depend on the language of the agreement, and
whether “he is aware, at the time the contract is made, that he has only limited knowledge . . . but treats [that] limited knowledge as sufficient.” Id. § 154.
100. PERILLO, supra note 18, § 9.27, at 337.
101. See id. § 9.27, at 337–38 (contrasting these types of mistakes with those caused by
an error in judgment).
102. See id. § 9.28, at 339 (contrasting a mistake of law with a mistake of fact, but observing that “[t]oday, the rule denying relief for [a] mistake of law has little vitality. It has
been eroded by so many qualifications and exceptions”).
103. See id. § 9.27, at 338 (“[C]ourts have floundered with ‘culpable’ verses ordinary
negligence, ‘bad faith’ verses ‘good faith’ negligence and other such nonsense.” (emphasis
added)).
104. See, e.g., Christianson v. Jansen, No. A11-1833, 2012 WL 2368914, at *2 (Minn. Ct.
App. June 25, 2012).
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teen elements.105
The case of the unshrunk material mishap is an example of a court
indicating that too good to be true is a valid, single-step test, but then
applying a unilateral mistake test instead. As part of World War II logistical efforts, the Philadelphia Quartermaster requested informal bids from
at least eight firms for a contract to supply 12,000 two-piece military
uniforms.106 In calculating a bid, the superintendent for Hyde Park
Clothes disregarded the language in the request for bids that the government would supply unshrunk material (which the successful bidder would
need to shrink).107 As a result, Hyde Park eventually required over
$12,000 worth of extra material to make the uniforms.108
Hyde Park asserted that the U.S. government should bear the extra
cost as the government should “not be permitted to snap up an offer that
[was] too good to be true.”109 Although acknowledging the argument and
not explicitly rejecting it, the Court of Federal Claims instead emphasized
Hyde Park’s negligence, specifically that (i) the invitation for bids clearly
stated, in capitalized and underlined wording, that the contractor would
receive unshrunk material; (ii) Hyde Park’s superintendent, who had
thirty-years experience, disregarded that language;110 and (iii) this transaction involved “almost a quarter of a million dollars.”111 Also, the court
observed that Hyde Park failed to promptly notify the U.S. government
of its mistake.112 In its conclusion, the court made no mention of the
TGTBT test and instead wrote, “[I]n this case, neither the [requirements]
of mutual mistake . . . nor . . . unilateral mistake by which the other party
should not be allowed to profit, are present.”113
In Fisher v. Stolaruk Corp., Fisher sued Stolaruk Corporation under the
Fair Labor Standards Act (the FLSA) for services rendered.114 The company’s attorney prepared an offer of judgment to settle for $5,000 “with
costs then accrued.”115 The company’s attorney mistakenly believed this
language would include attorney’s fees, but precedent established that it
did not.116 If the $5,000 amount did not include attorney’s fees, “the offer . . . was more than twenty-five percent greater than what plaintiff
105. See MURRAY, supra note 22, § 28.27, at 112.
106. See Hyde Park Clothes, Inc. v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 589, 589 (Ct. Cl. 1949).
107. See id. at 590.
108. See id.
109. Id. (quoting 1 WILLISTON, supra note 49, § 94).
110. See id.
111. Id. at 591. The total contract price agreed upon by the parties was $216,000. Id. at
589.
112. See id. at 589–90 (reporting that after the contract was awarded on August 11,
Hyde Park ordered extra material on October 30, did not notify the government that it
expected the government to pay this extra cost until November 7, and failed to state there
had been a mistake); id. at 591 (distinguishing a case in which the party withdrew its bid
promptly once it discovered the mistake).
113. Id. at 592.
114. See Fisher v. Stolaruk Corp., 110 F.R.D. 74, 75 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
115. Id.
116. See id. (citing Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1, 105 (1985)).
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could recover at trial”117 under the FLSA. The employee’s attorney attempted to accept the offer of $5,000, and soon thereafter, the employee’s
attorney “petition[ed] the court separately for attorney’s fees under the
Act.”118
The company asked the court to rescind the settlement agreement.119
The court cited the Williston treatise for the proposition that “an offeree
will not be permitted to snap up an offer that is too good to be true.”120
However, the court promptly turned to the unilateral mistake doctrine
and listed a four-part test, including the need to have exercised reasonable care and the ability to “place the [nonmistaken] party in a position of
status quo ante.”121 The court concluded the company was entitled to
rescission.122 Although the court observed the attorney’s mistake
“demonstrated some amount of legal negligence,”123 the attorney
promptly notified the other side of the mistake, and there would be no
prejudice to the other side.124
A crop-conveyance confusion case also encouraged a single-step
TGTBT test, but the court decided the case on unilateral mistake.125 In
Christianson v. Jansen, the seller’s attorney drafted the agreement for a
sale of farmland.126 The seller did not intend to sell the crops growing on
the farmland, but the contract said nothing about the crops.127 The
seller’s attorney was unaware of the Minnesota rule that if a sales agreement is silent, ownership of the crops follows ownership of the land.128
The trial court granted the buyer’s motion for summary judgment to receive the crops (or damages), and the seller appealed.129
The appellate court proclaimed that no binding agreement can be
based on an offer that was too good to be true, but it failed to discuss the
facts needed to determine how good the offer was, such as the contract
sales price, the fair market value of the land, the fair market value of the
crops, prior negotiations between the parties, or other similar information.130 Instead, the court asserted that rescission is not available for a
117. Id. at 76.
118. Id. at 75.
119. See id. at 76.
120. Id. (citing 13 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAWS OF CONTRACTS
§ 1573, at 490 n.15 (3d ed. 1970)).
121. Id. at 76. The court’s application of the four-part unilateral mistake test could be
said to express at least part of the rationale of the too-good-to-be-true test, as the court
emphasized that the plaintiff was on notice that a mistake had been made. Id.
122. See id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Christianson v. Jansen, No. A11-1833, 2012 WL 2368914, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App.
June 25, 2012).
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id. (“Absent a contractual provision to the contrary, ‘title to growing crops
passes with title to the land.’”).
129. See id.
130. Id. at *2.
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unilateral mistake of law131 and that the “unilateral mistake [doctrine]
does not warrant rescission of a contract absent ambiguity, fraud[,] or
misrepresentation,”132 or inequitable conduct.133 Although the contract
was silent about the ownership of the crops, the court stated that the contract was not ambiguous because the law was clear.134
C. CATEGORY #3: MIXING TGTBT

WITH

OTHER LEGAL TESTS

In several cases, courts have acknowledged too good to be true as a
valid, single-step test but used a different legal theory to decide the dispute. In the spray foam disaster case, a general contractor requested a
sub-bid from Cal-Co Insulation on a building renovation project including separate prices for (i) rigid-board insulation and (ii) spray foam insulation.135 Cal-Co quoted $30,320 if the building owner wanted spray foam
insulation.136 Cal-Co subsequently realized that the material costs alone
would be about seven to eight times higher than their entire bid.137 When
Cal-Co refused to supply the spray foam insulation, the general contractor hired another firm and sued Cal-Co for $303,000.138
Cal-Co argued that their bid was too good to be true and that the general contractor had a duty to inquire before accepting.139 In response, the
general contractor argued that they did not know and had no reason to
know, that the bid was a mistake.140 Regarding the TGTBT test, the
court said, “Both parties have legitimate arguments to support their position and the issue is a close call.”141 Facts considered in the TGTBT analysis included that Cal-Co’s bid was ten times lower than all other
insulation bids, although the other insulation bidders only estimated
rigid-based insulation; none of them estimated a price for spray foam
insulation.142
Curiously, the court then focused on several facts indicating that CalCo’s representative was grossly negligent, which would seem to have
nothing to do with how good the estimate was under a TGTBT test.143
Specifically, the court stated, “Ross Pierce had been in the busi131. See id.
132. Id.
133. See id. On this point, the court stated, “[H]ow [the buyer] could have acted inequitably by harvesting that crop [was] neither clear nor explained.” Id. at *3.
134. See id. (explaining that if the agreement is otherwise silent, the crops transfer with
the land). Finally, the court applied the rule of construction that even if the contract was
ambiguous (as argued by the seller), “[a]mbiguous contractual provisions are construed
against the drafting party.” Id.
135. See Portzen Constr., Inc. v. Cal-Co Insulation, Inc., No. 13-0758, 2014 WL 2347821,
at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 29, 2014).
136. See id. at *1.
137. See id. The estimate of the material cost was between $206,700 and $243,750. Id.
138. See id. at *2.
139. See id. at *5.
140. See id. Indeed, the trial court “made factual findings [that] Portzen did not know or
should not have known Cal-Co’s bid was too good to be true.” Id.
141. Id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
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ness . . . for years. He had been applying spray foam insulation [for five
years] . . . . He had attended a four-day course specifically pertaining to
spray foam insulation. He ha[d] access to his sales rep, and he ha[d] dealt
with the same rep for five years.”144 Only after this apparent finding of
culpable negligence did the court conclude that the bid was not too good
to be true145 and that Cal-Co was liable for over $300,000.146
Another case asking whether a proposal was too good to be true but
then moving on to apply a different contract law principle to decide the
controversy was Sumerel v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.147 Bob and
Sally Sumerel and others sued Goodyear for selling defective products
and won a jury verdict of approximately $1.3 million plus 36% of certain
costs and expenses (and 48% of other costs and expenses).148 The attorneys had difficulty agreeing on the precise amount of damages, leading to
a series of emails and other communications.149 At one point, a co-counsel for Goodyear sent the plaintiffs’ attorney an email overstating the
amount Goodyear owed by $550,000 with the following message: “Here
are our charts . . . that Goodyear believes are appropriate. . . . Please
review these, then let’s discuss.”150
The plaintiffs’ attorney immediately spotted a miscalculation in the
charts—Goodyear’s co-counsel had failed to assess only 36% (or 48%) of
the costs and expenses.151 Instead, Goodyear’s co-counsel had added all
of the costs and expenses to the amount Goodyear owed.152 The plaintiffs’ attorney did not discuss these figures as requested by Goodyear’s cocounsel.153 Instead, plaintiffs’ attorney left a voice message and promptly
followed with a fax accepting the bloated amount.154 Goodyear refused
to pay the extra $550,000, and the plaintiffs sued.155 The trial court held
for the plaintiffs, and Goodyear appealed.156
On appeal, the court observed, “In our view, the present case is a prototype for a purported offer that was ‘on its face manifestly too good to
be true.’”157 The court described the mathematical calculations as “simple” and “inconsistent,” which raised a “duty . . . to inquire before attempting to accept the purported ‘offer.’”158 In regards to the duty to
inquire, as discussed above, the plaintiffs’ attorney did not ask Goodyear’s co-counsel about the apparent error and instead immediately at144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
See id.
See id. at *6–7.
232 P.3d 128, 134–35 (Colo. App. 2009).
Goodyear manufactured a defective part for a heating system. See id. at 130.
See id.
Id. at 131.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 132.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 134–35.
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tempted to accept. Thus, if the court truly believed that a TGTBT test
(and the duty to inquire) were sufficient devices for deciding a case, no
further legal analysis would have been necessary.
Instead, the court discussed a different legal rule—that the mistaken
communication could not have been an offer because it did not invite
acceptance.159 Rather than inviting acceptance, the communication contained “qualifying language,”160 specifically saying, “Please review these,
then let’s discuss.”161 As a result, it was not an offer—it was just a part of
preliminary negotiations, so the plaintiffs and their attorneys never had
power of acceptance.162 Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the
trial court and directed a satisfaction of judgment order favoring Goodyear, thereby rescinding the transaction.163
Similarly, in Lange v. United States, the court initially indicated that the
dispute might be decided on the grounds the proposal was too good to be
true, but the court then expanded its analysis.164 Lange Brothers hired a
subcontractor, C.M. Wilkinson, to construct a laundry chute in a laundry
building for the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland.165 C.M.
Wilkinson initially offered to build the chute for $347 but did not receive
the specifications until after signing the contract, approximately four
months later.166 Initially, C.M. Wilkinson assumed it could use steel
sheets typically costing five cents a pound, but the specifications called
for stainless steel sheets costing forty-six cents a pound.167
Without the mistake, C.M. Wilkinson would have bid $1,271, and C.M.
Wilkinson eventually offered to eliminate all profit and overhead and
build the chute for $1,071.168 The parties signed a second contract for
$1,106, but subsequently, Lange Brothers refused to pay more than $325,
attempting to hold C.M. Wilkinson bound by the first agreement.169
Lange Brothers asserted that the second contract (for $1,106) was unenforceable due to a lack of consideration.170
159. See id. at 135.
160. Id. at 134.
161. Id. at 132.
162. In the alternative, the court considered the multi-part test for unilateral mistake
under Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 153 and 154 which includes (i) whether the
mistake related to a basic assumption on which the contract was made; (ii) whether the
mistake would have a material effect on the agreed-upon exchange; (iii) whether the mistaken party bore the risk of the mistake; (iv) whether enforcing the contract would be
unconscionable or oppressive; and (v) whether rescission would pose a substantial hardship
on the other party. Id. at 136.
163. See id. at 138.
164. Lange v. United States, 120 F.2d 886, 886 (4th Cir. 1941).
165. See id.
166. C.M. Wilkinson made a written offer to construct the chute for $347 on November
11, 1938. See id. C. M. Wilkinson received the specifications after they signed a contract on
March 1, 1939. See id. at 887.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id. at 888–89.
170. Lange Brothers pointed out that C.M. Wilkinson did not agree to provide any
additional services—the only significant changes between the first and second contracts
were the change in price and an extension of time. See id. at 889.
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In regards to the enforceability of the first contract, the court said it
was tempted to simply find that the bid for $347 was too good to be true,
and therefore, it was not an offer capable of being accepted.171 The court
then briefly discussed some factors considered in a typical unilateral mistake analysis—the subcontractor’s degree of fault and whether the other
party would be prejudiced—but the court complained that “the instant
record is silent on this point.”172 As a result, the court could not draw
inferences that otherwise would be “quite obvious.”173
Ultimately, the court applied the legal concept of “unforeseen and substantial difficulties” to conclude that the first contract was unenforceable.174 As a result, the second contract was supported by consideration,
and C.M. Wilkinson was entitled to payment under the second contract.175 Thus, rather than use the single-step TGTBT test, the court used
a “liberal application to the exception of unforeseen difficulties.”176
Likewise, in perhaps the most widely studied, post-Millennial contract
case using “too good to be true,” Judge Kimba Wood of the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York employed it as one of five
factors to conclude that a communication was a joke instead of an offer.177 In Leonard v. Pepsico, Inc., a “darling of casebook writers,”178
Pepsi conducted a promotional campaign awarding so-called “Pepsi
Points” for purchasing Pepsi soft drinks.179 A customer could redeem the
Pepsi Points for merchandise bearing the Pepsi logo (or colors), as listed
in a catalogue.180 Consumers also could purchase Pepsi Points for ten
cents per point.181
One of Pepsi’s television commercials stated that a consumer could
purchase a Harrier Jet with seven million Pepsi Points, although the Harrier Jet was not included in the catalogue.182 Leonard and his acquaintances joined together and sent Pepsi slightly more than $700,000 cash for
seven million Pepsi Points, and they directed that Pepsi send Leonard a
Harrier Jet.183 The cost of a Harrier Jet at the time was $23 million.184
Pepsi refused to deliver, and Leonard sued.185 Pepsi raised several suc171. See id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 890.
175. See id. at 889–90.
176. Id.
177. Leonard v. Pepsico, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 116, 129 (S.D.N.Y 1999), aff’d, 210 F.3d 88
(2d Cir. 2000).
178. Keith A. Rowley, You Asked for It, You Got It . . . Toy Yoda: Practical Jokes,
Prizes, and Contract Law, 3 NEV. L.J. 526, 536 n.39 (2003) (listing eight law school
casebooks using Leonard v. Pepsico, Inc. as a principal case).
179. See Leonard, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 118.
180. See id. at 119.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. They sent a check for $700,008.50, along with fifteen original Pepsi Points coupons.
Id.
184. See id. at 129.
185. Id. at 120.
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cessful defenses, including that the purported sale of goods would violate
the Statute of Frauds under the Uniform Commercial Code186 because
the price was $500 or more and Pepsi never signed a writing to sell a
Harrier Jet.187 The court also followed the general rule that an advertisement is not an offer.188
In addition, Judge Wood’s opinion included a lengthy discussion that
the commercial was a joke, not an offer to enter into a binding contract.189 In an attempt to explain why the commercial was funny,190 the
opinion described five features. The first four reasons were: (i) the commercial, like many others, indicated that by using the product “one will
become attractive, stylish, desirable, and admired by all;”191 (ii) it is
highly improbable that the teenage boy in the ad would be capable of
safely flying a Harrier Jet;192 (iii) the events in the commercial are the
stuff of fantasy, including the teenager’s school having a suitable landing
pad for a Harrier Jet;193 and (iv) a Harrier Jet is designed for attacking
and destroying surface and air targets, a very different mission than transporting a teenager to his local high school.194
Fifth and finally, Judge Wood discussed the great disparity between the
price advertised in the commercial (seven million Pepsi Points that could
be purchased for $700,000), and the cost of a Harrier Jet ($23 million).195
The court commented that a price of $700,000 would be “a deal too good
to be true,”196 and this helped explain why the commercial was funny. In
conclusion, Judge Wood listed three reasons for the holding and did not
treat the single-step TGTBT test as a separate basis for the result.197
D. CATEGORY #4: JUST USING TGTBT

TO

DESCRIBE

OR

SUMMARIZE

Sometimes courts use the phrase “too good to be true” merely to describe the facts or summarize the essence of the dispute. For example, in a
please-pay-me-for-nothing case, Knox Energy, LLC, a natural gas pro186. See id. at 131 (citing U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1977)).
187. See id. at 131 (“There is simply no writing between the parties that evidences any
transaction.”).
188. See id. at 132 (“[T]he commercial was merely an advertisement, not a unilateral
offer.”).
189. The basic legal principal is that if the speaker did not intend to be bound and a
reasonable person would conclude from outward manifestations that the speaker did not
intend to be bound, there was no offer, and the other party could not accept. See PERILLO,
supra note 18, § 2.4, at 28.
190. Leonard, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 129 (“Explaining why a joke is funny is a daunting
task . . . .”).
191. Id. at 128.
192. See id. at 128–29.
193. See id. at 129.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. Id.
197. See id. at 132.
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ducer, contracted with Gasco Drilling for two years.198 Part of the deal
was a “stand-by” clause that Knox Energy would pay Gasco $10,800 a
day per drilling rig when Gasco was on site, but Knox Energy was not
directing Gasco to drill.199 About a year after the two-year contract terminated, someone at Knox Energy inexplicably emailed a one-year extension form to Gasco, which Gasco’s CEO signed and returned.200 For
the next year, there were no communications between the parties, and
Gasco performed no drilling for Knox Energy.201 At the end of the year,
Gasco sued Knox Energy for over $7 million, arguing they should be paid
under the standby clause.202
The trial court’s instruction to the jury in the second trial (the judge
granted judgment as a matter of law for the defendant at the close of the
plaintiff’s case-in-chief in the first trial, but the court of appeals reversed
and remanded) stated in part, “A party cannot snap-up an offer that is
too good to be true.”203 But the very next sentence in the jury instruction
focused on the doctrine of unilateral mistake.204 In concluding that this
jury instruction accurately summarized Virginia law, the trial court stated
that the “too good to be true” language was merely intended as a “colloquial phrase” which “accurately reflects [a] basic premise.”205 The court
stated, “Viewed alongside the next sentence, the meaning of the language
was clear—the law does not permit Gasco to take advantage of a mistake
of which it knew or should have known.”206
Similarly, in a “gem of a case,”207 which could be called the Carat Confusion Caper, the court used the phrase “too good to be true” merely to
describe the situation.208 Thomas DePrince, a former antique and jewelry
dealer,209 on a Starboard cruise from Miami, visited the cruise ship’s jewelry store and asked the sales manager about a large, loose, twenty-carat
diamond listed in a catalogue.210 The sales manager “had never dealt with
a diamond of such magnitude, [and] sent an email inquiry to Starboard’s
corporate office in Miami.”211 Starboard’s corporate office contacted the
198. See Knox Energy, LLC v. Gasco Drilling Inc., 258 F. Supp. 3d 709, 713 (W.D. Va.
2017) (citing Knox Energy, LLC v. Gasco Drilling Inc., 637 F. App’x 735, 736–37 (4th Cir.
2016)).
199. Id. Knox Energy was only obligated to pay the standby rate for 328 days each year.
Id. This was also called a “take-or-pay” provision. Id. Gasco guaranteed it would make two
oil rigs available for Knox Energy whenever it requested work. Id.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. Id. at 737.
204. The next sentence in the jury instruction was: “If either party knew or should have
known that the other had made a mistake with respect to the alleged agreement, then there
was no meeting of the minds, and no contract.” Id. (emphasis added).
205. Id. at 738.
206. Id.
207. DePrince v. Starboard Cruise Servs., Inc., 163 So. 3d 586, 589 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2015), vacated, 271 So. 3d 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018) (en banc).
208. Id. at 588.
209. Id. at 592.
210. See id. at 589.
211. Id.
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diamond supplier, who emailed the following information: “EMERALD
CUT 20.64 carats D VVS2 GIA VG Price $235,000.”212 The diamond
supplier intended the price to be $235,000 per carat, or a total of approximately $4,850,400.213 The sales manager on the cruise ship misunderstood
and sold the diamond to DePrince for $235,000 plus $25 for shipping.214
Before shipping the diamond, Starboard discovered its mistake, refunded
all of DePrince’s money, telephoned DePrince to explain the situation,
offered him discounts for future cruises, and repudiated the contract.215
When DePrince sued, Starboard defended on grounds of unilateral
mistake, and the court initially applied a four-part test for unilateral mistake.216 The court described $235,000 as a “too good to be true price,”217
and noted that when DePrince mentioned the $235,000 price quote to a
certified gemologist and a person holding the highest available degree in
gemology,218 they both advised him that the “sale price was too good to
be true.”219 Nevertheless, the court did not treat too good to be true as a
separate legal test; instead, it applied the unilateral mistake doctrine.220
In a subsequent appeal, the court modified the test for unilateral mistake
and held for Starboard.221
III. ADDRESSING HIDDEN POLICIES WITH THE
UNILATERAL MISTAKE DOCTRINE
A. IDENTIFYING

THE

HIDDEN POLICIES

The cases using a single-step TGTBT test tend to emphasize the facts
and provide scant policy analysis.222 Other contract law authorities, however, enunciate multiple policy issues likely at play in these cases.
On the one hand, enforcing a promise regardless of the equivalency of
the bargain is consistent with fundamental, objective contract law principles, such as the primacy of the parties’ intent, the sanctity of written
contracts, and the freedom of contract.223 Courts and commentators have
212. Id.
213. See id. at 590.
214. See id. at 589–90.
215. See id. at 590.
216. See id. at 591–94 (confirming the same outcome under a two-part test some courts
applied in prior Florida cases and a three-part test from the new state jury instructions).
217. Id. at 588.
218. DePrince’s life partner was a certified gemologist and DePrince’s sister held the
highest available degree in geology. Id. at 589.
219. Id.
220. See id. at 591.
221. DePrince v. Starboard Cruise Servs., Inc., 271 So. 3d 11, 21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2018) (en banc).
222. Occasionally, these cases provide a brief policy discussion about contract formation, such as stressing that the focus must be on the outward manifestations of the parties
rather than their subjective, mental beliefs. See, e.g., Christianson v. Jansen, No. A11-1833,
2012 WL 2368914, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. June 25, 2012).
223. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Role of Fault in Contract Law: Unconscionability,
Unexpected Circumstances, Interpretation, Mistake, and Nonperformance, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 1413, 1414 (2009) (“[T]he law should effectuate the objectives of parties to promissory transactions.”).
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stressed the importance of these principles.224 From an economic view, if
people doubt that the courts will enforce contracts, they may be less
likely to make contracts, thereby reducing economic cooperation and
slowing overall economic growth.225 Furthermore, fulfilling promises—
whether oral or written—and telling the truth are valuable social
norms.226
Also, enforcing a promise regardless of how lopsided the deal supports
another objective, bedrock principle of contract law. Many of the
TGTBT cases involve a mistake in price—often, one party promised to
provide goods or services for an extremely cheap price.227 All attorneys
likely remember the ancient maxim from their first-year contracts class228
that a court will not judge the adequacy of consideration.229 Theoretically, as part of the freedom of contract, individuals and entities should
be able to make good or bad bargains without government interference—
even if those deals are too good to be true.
224. See, e.g., Wood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 809 F.2d 954, 961 (2d Cir. 1987) (“Freedom of contract is an important cornerstone of national labor policy . . . .”); Moss v. Fed.
Power Comm’n, 502 F.2d 461, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (discussing “sanctity of contract”); In re
Caldwell Port Elevator, Inc., 23 B.R. 154, 156 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1982) (“[F]reedom of
contract is an important principle . . . nurtured by courts.”); see also PERILLO, supra note
18, § 1.3, at 5 (“[T]he parties’ power to contract as they please for lawful purposes remains
a basic principle of our legal system.”).
225. See PERILLO, supra note 18, § 1.4, at 8–9 (discussing the “economic efficiency” of
enforcing contracts).
226. See Eisenberg, supra note 223, at 1430 (“The efficiency of [the contract law] system
rests on” three legs, one of which is “the moral norm of promise keeping”); see also United
States v. Urutyan, 564 F.3d 679, 682 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting a party who asserted that “a
man’s word is his bond”); Ehlert v. Comm’r., 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 1048 (1985) (mentioning
“the old handshake concept that a man is as good as his word”).
227. See, e.g., Wender Presses, Inc. v. United States, 343 F.2d 961 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Riley
Bros. Constr. Inc. v. Shuck, 704 N.W.2d 197 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005); Hyde Park Clothes,
Inc. v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 589 (Ct. Cl. 1949); PERILLO, supra note 18, § 9.27, at 335
(observing that the most frequent fact pattern involves a construction contractor making a
computational error or misconstruing specifications).
228. KNAPP, CRYSTAL & PRINCE, supra note 16, at 101 (“[C]onsideration traditionally
has been one of the prominent ingredients of a course in basic American contract law.”).
229. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“If the requirement of consideration is met, there is no additional requirement of . . . equivalence in the
values exchanged . . . .”); PERILLO, supra note 18, § 4.4, at 162. In contrast, under old
Roman law, a sale of real estate could be set aside if one party was paying twice what the
property was worth. KNAPP, CRYSTAL & PRINCE, supra note 16, at 649. English common
law and U.S. contract law have rejected this double (or half) price rule; however, there is
an exception for nominal or token consideration. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 71, cmt. b, illus. 5 (AM. L. INST. 1981). But see PERILLO, supra note 18, § 4.6, at 166
(criticizing the Restatement approach, arguing that the “recital of the token [consideration]
manifests a bargained-for-exchange”). And there is also an exception for benefits or detriments that were not bargained for. See Pennsy Supply, Inc. v. American Ash Recycling
Corp. of Penn., 895 A.2d 595, 600–01 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (discussing Professor Williston’s
famous “benevolent man” hypothetical and quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. that “the
promise must induce the detriment and the detriment must induce the promise”). Determining when consideration is nominal or token is not a precise science—a transaction
might be characterized as an enforceable part-sale and part-gift transaction. As an example, a leading commentator provides that if A sells his car, worth $5,000, to his friend B for
$1,000, the agreement should be enforced “even though A’s primary motive in entering
into the transactions is friendship.” PERILLO, supra note 18, § 4.7, at 167.
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On the other hand, refusing to enforce a promise that is too good to be
true can fulfill multiple subjective, equitable policy goals and promote
beneficial social norms that run through several contract law doctrines.
Although contract law often is called a strict liability system,230 numerous
equitable doctrines are available to rescind unfair agreements. The doctrine of unconscionability encourages fairness by refusing to enforce
transactions in which a party with superior bargaining power imposed unreasonable terms.231 The doctrines of economic duress and undue influence also promote fairness in the bargaining process.232 In addition,
parties cannot profit from fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment for
equitable and moral reasons.233
B. BALANCING

THE

HIDDEN POLICIES

Balancing these conflicting policies can be challenging, but courts routinely perform that task in unilateral mistake cases. “Nowhere in the law
of contracts do objective elements supporting the certainty and stability
of transactions and subjective elements supporting fairness . . . clash as
frequently” as in mistake cases.234 As described earlier, courts may apply
several elements from a lengthy list when deciding whether to rescind a
mistaken promise.235 Many of the elements reflect important policy concerns at play in TGTBT cases.
For instance, when applying the unilateral mistake doctrine, whether a
court considers the mistaken party’s degree of negligence or carelessness
reflects a policy choice.236 On the one hand, if the court believes that
freedom of contract is paramount, then the court will view contract law as
a strict liability system and the degree of fault will be irrelevant—the mistaken party will have to fulfill his or her promise.237
230. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 11, intro. note (AM. L. INST.
1981) (“Contract liability is strict liability. It is an accepted maxim that . . . contracts are to
be kept. The obligor is therefore liable in damages for breach of contract even if he is
without fault . . . .”). Courts and commentators have noted this principle. See, e.g., United
States v. Bolton, 496 F. Supp. 3d 146, 156 (D.D.C. 2020); Eisenberg, supra note 223, at
1413.
231. See U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1977) (“The principle
is one of prevention of oppression and unfair surprise.”); PERILLO, supra note 18, § 9.40, at
355 (discussing “[s]uperior bargaining power”).
232. See PERILLO, supra note 18, § 9.6, at 294 (“[C]ases now hold that a threat to breach
a contract constitutes duress if the threatened breach would, if carried out, result in irreparable injury because of the absence of . . . other reasonable alternative[s].”); see id.
§§ 9.10–.11, at 299–303 (regarding undue influence).
233. See id. §§ 9.13, 9.20, 9.22 at 304–06, 315–22.
234. Id. § 9.25, at 328 (introducing a section titled “Errors, Mistakes, Misunderstandings”); see also MURRAY, supra note 22, § 28.27, at 108.
235. See supra notes 99–105 and accompanying text (listing eleven possible elements
that could be included in a unilateral mistake test).
236. See PERILLO, supra note 18, § 9.27, at 336.
237. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 11, intro. note (AM. L. INST. 1981);
Paradine v. Jane [1647] 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B.). In Paradine v. Jane, Paradine agreed to
rent certain real estate from Jane for a term of years, but Paradine could not use it for
almost three years because Prince Rupert and his army subsequently entered and occupied
the land during the English Civil War. Id.
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On the other hand, a court may view fairness as an important policy
and will relieve the mistaken party if the degree of negligence was slight
or otherwise excusable.238 Advocates of this view may emphasize that
some types of errors are an inescapable part of the human condition.239
“[B]lunders that result from transient errors in the actor’s mental machinery” may take the form of mathematical errors, number transposition,
clerical mistakes, or “misunderstandings of specifications, formula, or
plans.”240 Although a party may customarily carry out tasks competently,
“every once in a while, [things go] awry.”241 In addition, even when the
“mistaken party is at fault, . . . [morally, the offeree is] more strongly at
fault if he tried to take advantage” of the mistake.242
One commentator analogizes these contractual mistake cases to lost
property situations and observes that, under the law, even if the property
owner was at fault for failure to exercise due care (in losing the property),
the finder of the property must return it to the true owner.243 Although
this rule may defeat the expectations of the finder, the rationale apparently is that those expectations were unjustified; the finder should not be
able to profit from the true owner’s mistake.244
Evaluating the degree of a party’s negligence and balancing these policy goals can lead to some linguistic acrobatics when applying the unilateral mistake doctrine. Courts may state that ordinary carelessness or
negligence will not preclude relief,245 and that a mistaken party worthy of
relief may be characterized as acting in good faith and engaging in fair
dealing.246 In contrast, mistaken parties not entitled to relief may be said
to have violated a legal duty or committed culpable negligence.247
Another policy-driven element of the unilateral mistake doctrine that
courts often consider is whether the other party knew, or had reason to
know, that the other side made a mistake.248 The appeal of a fairness
238. See, e.g., Speckel v. Perkins, 364 N.W.2d 890, 892–93 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (finding a poorly written and confusing letter to be valid grounds for rescission).
239. See Eisenberg, supra note 223, at 1425.
240. Id. (referring to “mechanical errors” and lapses in concentration).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1427.
244. Id. at 1425.
245. BMW Fin. Servs. NA, LLC v. DeLoach, No. G05021, 2017 WL 1832250, at *4 (Cal.
Ct. App. May 8, 2017).
246. KNAPP, CRYSTAL & PRINCE, supra note 16, at 739.
247. See, e.g., Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. Farmers Nat’l Bank of Cordell, 624 F.2d 105,
109 (10th Cir. 1980) (explaining that “culpable negligence . . . preclude[s] a party from
claiming mistake”); President & Council of Mount St. Mary’s Coll. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 233 F. Supp. 787, 798 (D. Md. 1964) (requiring that the mistaken party not have violated a “positive legal duty” or committed “culpable negligence” to be entitled to rescission for unilateral mistake). A leading commentator has described such characterizations
as “nonsense.” PERILLO, supra note 18, § 9.27, at 336.
248. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. Presumably, if a proposal is too good to
be true, a reasonable person would know it, so the nonmistaken party would have reason
to know the proposal was a mistake. Leading commentators say these are true unilateral
mistake situations, see KNAPP, CRYSTAL & PRINCE, supra note 16, at 737, presumably because one side knows the truth that the other side is mistaken.
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argument can change depending on whether the nonmistaken party (i)
knew about the mistake, (ii) should have known about the mistake, or
(iii) neither knew nor should have known about the mistake.249
In terms of the policy analysis, if the other party actually knew that the
proposal was a mistake, the equities seem to weigh heavily in favor of
rescinding the agreement.250 While the mistaken party likely was at fault
for failing to exercise due care, the offeree is “more strongly at fault if he
tried to take advantage.”251 Likewise, if the nonmistaken party had reason to know the proposal was a mistake, fairness may dictate that the
mistaken party be released from his or her promise, and the nonmistaken
party should not profit from the mistake.252 “[A]dministrability considerations strongly favor relief” to the mistaken party, because it will generally be “too difficult” to prove the other party actually knew.253 Some
cases indicate that the nonmistaken party had reason to know if the mistake was palpable.254
The remaining question regarding this element is whether fairness dictates that the mistaken party obtain relief even if the nonmistaken party
did not know and had no reason to know the proposal was a mistake. As
a policy matter, the nonmistaken parties in these cases were justified in
relying on the proposal and arguably should recover damages for any
costs or expenses from their justified reliance.255 But in these situations, it
may be unfair to enforce the promise as a contract and allow the nonmistaken party to profit, particularly when that will impose a substantial burden on the mistaken party.256 This leads to other frequently employed
unilateral mistake elements, such as whether the mistake must be material and related to a basic assumption of the agreement, and whether the
nonmistaken party must be returned to the status quo (as if the mistake
249. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
250. See Eisenberg, supra note 223, at 1425–26.
251. Id. at 1425 (stating that, “as a matter of morality,” the nonmistaken party “would
be viewed as improperly taking advantage of” the mistaken party); Michael I. Myerson,
The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer Form Contracts, 47
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263, 1290 (1993) (claiming that “the party who knows of an error is the
‘better mistake preventer’”).
252. See Eisenberg, supra note 223, at 1426.
253. Id.; see also MURRAY, supra note 22, § 28.41, at 259 (“[O]ften, . . . it will be possible to show no more than that the party had reason to know.”).
254. See Wil-Fred’s, Inc. v. Metro. Sanitary Dist., 372 N.E.2d 946, 951 (Ill. App. Ct.
1978) (finding that the mistake was “grave” when the contractor’s bid was seventeen percent lower than the next lowest bid). But see Heifetz Metal Crafts, Inc. v. Peter Kiewit
Sons’ Co., 264 F.2d 435, 437–38 (8th Cir. 1959) (concluding the general contractor had no
reason to know the subcontractor had made a mistake even though the bid was thirty
percent lower than the next lowest bid), discussed in MURRAY, supra note 22, § 28.41, at
259); Handle Constr. Co. v. Norcon, Inc., 264 P.3d 367, 374 (Alaska 2011) (concluding that
the mistake was not palpable even though the bid was thirty-five percent lower than the
next lowest bid).
255. Eisenberg, supra note 223, at 1427. Although, as discussed elsewhere, the unilateral mistake doctrine generally is a multi-element test, so other facts would be relevant,
such as materiality. See supra notes 99–105 (listing eleven possible elements).
256. See Eisenberg, supra note 223, at 1427 (citing Glover v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 664
F.2d 1101, 1105 (8th Cir. 1981)).
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had not been made).257
A few courts applying the unilateral mistake doctrine have also required the nonmistaken party to have somehow caused or induced the
other party’s mistake.258 As a matter of policy, the fairness argument that
the nonmistaken party should not profit is even stronger in these situations. However, a memorable Florida case flatly rejected this requirement
and granted the mistaken party relief even when there was no evidence
that the nonmistaken party caused or induced the mistake.259
IV. ABANDONING TGTBT AND REVAMPING THE
UNILATERAL MISTAKE DOCTRINE
As discussed below, the unilateral mistake doctrine could likely be clarified in many jurisdictions.260 Nevertheless, as asserted in Part II, a state
has likely already balanced the policy concerns at play in TGTBT cases
when the state formulated its unilateral mistake doctrine. Thus, in cases
involving a mistake, the analysis can be conducted with the unilateral
mistake doctrine. Even in cases involving a joke, exaggeration, or other
figures of speech, rather than a mistake, the single-step TGTBT test
likely can be avoided.
A. THE SINGLE-STEP TGTBT TEST IS UNNECESSARY
CASES

IN

MISTAKE

Each of the cases discussed above that use a single-step TGTBT test
and involve a mistake could have been decided under the unilateral mistake doctrine. The court in Speckel v. Perkins, the case of the opportunistic attorney, focused on contract formation, but it also stated, “A
unilateral mistake . . . is . . . a basis for rescission [if] there is ambiguity,
fraud, misrepresentation, or where the contract may be rescinded without
prejudice to the other party.”261 However, the court failed to apply this
unilateral mistake test in Speckel, even though the settlement letter was
ambiguous,262 and there was no indication of prejudice to the other
party.263 The Minnesota Court of Appeals confirmed the availability of
this approach under Minnesota law in Dixon v. Progressive Insurance
257. See supra notes 99–105 and accompanying text (listing other unilateral mistake
elements).
258. KNAPP, CRYSTAL & PRINCE, supra note 16, at 738 (referring to a “few courts”).
259. See, e.g., DePrince v. Starboard Cruise Servs., Inc., 271 So. 3d 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2018) (en banc).
260. See infra notes 301–309 and accompanying text.
261. Speckel v. Perkins, 364 N.W.2d 890, 893 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
262. Id. at 891. The letter stated that the policy limit was $50,000 and that “I cannot
agree that this is a limits case.” Id. Nevertheless, the letter then offered a $50,000 settlement. Id. In addition, the letter then anticipated further negotiations, even though the original amount demanded by the plaintiff was $50,000. Id.
263. The opposing party, the plaintiff in the lawsuit, could presumably continue settlement negotiations or pursue litigation. Id.
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Co.264
In the case of the careless concrete contractor,265 the court discussed
promissory estoppel and the single-step TGTBT test266 but never expressly addressed the unilateral mistake doctrine. The court concluded
that the nonmistaken party did not have reason to know the bid was a
mistake, and the agreement based on the bid was enforceable267—in
other words, the bid was not too good to be true. The court could have
reached the same result under at least one formulation of the unilateral
mistake doctrine according to the applicable law.268
In the case of the one-line booboo,269 the Court of Claims concluded
that, under either the TGTBT test or the unilateral mistake doctrine, no
relief was available for the mistaken party.270 In the “six-cents-on-thedollar debt-forgiveness” case,271 the court did not discuss the unilateral
mistake doctrine at all. Instead, the court concluded there was no enforceable agreement to forgive the debt for six-cents-on-the-dollar because that proposal was too good to be true,272 but the court could have
reached the same result under the jurisdiction’s unilateral mistake doctrine.273 Finally, in the case of the confused school district,274 the court
stated that the result under the TGTBT test and the unilateral mistake
264. Dixon v. Progressive Ins. Co., No. 27-CV-12-9854, 2013 WL 2928121, at *3 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2013) (discussing four different formulations of the unilateral mistake doctrine
available under Minnesota law, including the test articulated in Speckel v. Perkins).
265. Riley Bros. Constr., Inc. v. Shuck, 704 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005).
266. Id. at 204.
267. Id.
268. Under Minnesota law, a necessary element for rescission under unilateral mistake
is that “rescission would impose no substantial hardship on the one seeking enforcement.”
Dixon, 2013 WL 2928121, at *3 (quoting Gethsemane Lutheran Church v. Zacho, 104
N.W.2d 645, 649 (Minn. 1960)). In the case of the careless concrete contractor, the specifications for the project prohibited the prime contractor (Riley Brothers) from charging any
more than the amount listed on its bid, so the prime contractor absorbed the extra cost of
$79,500 charged by the replacement subcontractor. Riley Bros. Constr., Inc., 704 N.W.2d at
201–03. Thus, if the court rescinded the contract, the prime contractor would have suffered
a substantial loss, precluding the use of the unilateral mistake doctrine to rescind the contract. See id. at 201.
269. Wender Presses, Inc. v. United States, 343 F.2d 961, 962 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
270. See id. at 962–64. The court found that the U.S. Government neither knew, nor
had reason to know that Wender Presses’ $7,751.51 bid for a used lathe was a mistake, even
though the next lowest bid was $3,441. Id. at 962–63.
271. Discover Bank v. Blake, No. 27-CV-16-1265, 2017 WL 3469525, at *2 (Minn. Ct.
App. Aug. 14, 2017).
272. Id. at *3. In addition, the customer failed to fulfill her duty to inquire. Id.
273. Under Minnesota law, the mistaken party can be relieved of contractual obligations if “enforcement would impose an oppressive burden on the [mistaken party] and
when rescission would impose no substantial hardship on the one seeking enforcement.”
Dixon, 2013 WL 2928121, at *3 (quoting Gethsemane Lutheran Church, 104 N.W.2d at
649). In the six-cents-on-the-dollar debt-forgiveness case, the creditor arguably would suffer a substantial burden if it collected only $619.83 on a debt of $10,699.37. See Discover
Bank, 2017 WL 3469525, at *1. Also, if the court rescinded the $619.83 proposal, the
debtor would be back at status quo ante. See generally Dixon, 2017 WL 2928121, at *2
(noting that an element of the unilateral mistake doctrine is whether rescission can return
the parties to staus quo).
274. Sheldon v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 284, No. A10-1186, 2011 WL 1236167, at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2011).
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doctrine would be the same,275 although the court’s analysis under unilateral mistake appears incomplete.276
B. THE SINGLE-STEP TGTBT TEST IS UNNECESSARY
EXAGGERATION CASES

IN

JOKE

AND

If a court was tempted to use the TGTBT test in a joke or exaggeration
case,277 it likely could be replaced with a soundly reasoned, multi-part
test. The case of the boastful cheater278 was probably not a mistake case
because MacDonald never wanted to retract his promise; instead, it was
more likely a joke case.279 As discussed earlier,280 Rob MacDonald, the
boastful cheater, promised at the beginning of his presentation that one
audience member would “walk out of here with a million dollars today.”281 At the end of the presentation, when the time came to pay, MacDonald only paid $100 and promised to pay one dollar per year for
approximately one million years.282 In connection with this declaration,
MacDonald laughed, so perhaps he believed his $1 million promise was a
funny joke.283
The court merely rejected MacDonald’s motions to dismiss in part and
never reached the merits.284 If it had inquired whether MacDonald’s
statement was a joke, the court could have consulted many resources.
Scholars have offered an amazing array of definitions and descriptions of
humor: one professor listed forty-five cognitive techniques or mechanisms typically used to generate humor;285 one scholarly tome devoted
almost eighty pages to listing prior definitions and descriptions of humor
275. Id. at *2.
276. The court indicates that relief under the unilateral mistake doctrine is available if
there was “ambiguity, fraud, misrepresentation, or where the contract may be rescinded
without prejudice to the other party.” Id. at *2 (quoting Speckel v. Perkins, 364 N.W.2d
890, 893 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). The court did not discuss the prejudice to the teacher—
perhaps it was too late in the year for the teacher to obtain a job at another school? Rather
than explore that point, the court simply stated that “a lack of effective communication
among respondents’ agents is not a unilateral mistake.” Id. at *2.
277. A few sources discuss contract cases involving jokes or exaggerations. See, e.g.,
Rowley, supra note 178; William A. Drennan, Joking, Exaggerating or Contracting?, 88
TENN. L. REV. 565 (2021).
278. Meram v. MacDonald, No. 06CV1071-L(AJB), 2006 WL 8456253, at *1 (S.D. Cal.
Oct. 23, 2006).
279. Objectively, MacDonald’s statement seems false—he said that an audience member would “leave with a million dollars,” and Meram only left with $100 and a promise of
one dollar a year for approximately one million years. Id. at *1. However, it appears that
MacDonald said exactly what he intended to say, and subsequently, there was no indication that MacDonald would have changed his statement. Id. at *2.
280. See supra notes 27–38 and accompanying text.
281. Meram, 2006 WL 8456253, at *2.
282. Id. at *1.
283. See id.
284. MacDonald moved to have Meram’s contract claim dismissed because his promise
was too good to be true. Id. at *1–2. The court refused to grant that motion (or MacDonald’s motion to have a fraud claim dismissed), but it did grant MacDonald’s motion to
dismiss a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and a claim under the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act. Id. at *4–6.
285. ARTHUR ASA BERGER, AN ANATOMY OF HUMOR 18 (1993).
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and related terms;286 and philosophers and psychologists have proposed
at least six different theories of humor.287
In the case of the boastful cheater, if his promise was a joke, it might
have been based on the superiority theory or the incongruity theory.288
Under the superiority theory, “People laugh down at someone else when
they realize they are better, or at least better off, than the butt of the
joke . . . . Both the maker of the joke and the audience simultaneously
consider themselves superior to the butt of the joke.”289 Meram would
have been the butt of the joke; the boastful cheater presumably believed
he was smarter than Meram, and the other audience members perhaps
felt that they would not have fallen for MacDonald’s prank. In addition,
Meram asserted that he “suffered humiliation.”290
Under the incongruity theory, “something . . . doesn’t fit,”291 which
challenges the audience—momentarily or for a longer time—until the comedian provides a humorous resolution. An incongruous joke typically
consists of a setup and a punch line.292 An example would be: “One day a
father was washing the car with his son. The son looked at the father and
said, ‘Dad, don’t you think you could just use a sponge?’”293 In the case
of the boastful cheater, perhaps MacDonald’s setup was telling the audience that he would give someone a million dollars just for staying until
the end of the presentation (and putting his or her business card in a
bowl).294 The audience members may have wondered how MacDonald
was going to fulfill this promise at a reasonable cost. The punch line, and
the relief of the mental tension created by the setup, occurred when MacDonald said he was only going to pay $100 today and promised to pay
one dollar a year for approximately one million years.295
In addition to mistakes and jokes, there are other situations when a
speaker’s words do not match the true intent, and the proposal could be
described as “too good to be true.” Many contract law cases classified as
joke or jest cases really involve nonhumorous exaggeration.296 As one
linguist wrote, hyperbole “is a common feature of everyday language
use.”297 As in other contexts, potential buyers, sellers, service providers,
286. See JON E. ROECKELEIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMOR 9–86 (2002).
287. See STEVEN GIMBEL, TAKE MY COURSE, PLEASE! THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMOR
271–73 (2018).
288. See id.
289. Id. at 271. The ancient philosopher Plato condemned this type of humor. Id. at
167–68.
290. Meram v. MacDonald, No. 06CV1071-L(AJB), 2006 WL 8456253, at *5 (S.D. Cal.
Oct. 23, 2006).
291. GIMBEL, supra note 287, at 273.
292. Id. at 237.
293. Id. at 240.
294. See Meram, 2006 WL 8456253, at *1.
295. Id.
296. See Drennan, supra note 277, at 3 (“Many of the other contract law controversies
customarily lumped in the joke category would be more accurately described as exaggeration cases.”).
297. CLAUDIA CLARIDGE, HYPERBOLE IN ENGLISH: A CORPUS-BASED STUDY OF EXAGGERATION 1 (2011) (discussing the work of the Roman rhetorician Quintillian).
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and other contracting parties can exaggerate, and sometimes the other
party may seek to enforce the promise as a binding contract.298 A fivefactor test for evaluating whether promissory language should be treated
as nonbinding exaggeration is available.299 One court has indicated that
figures of speech may not be enforced, such as if a party said, “I’ll eat my
hat” upon the performance of some future task.300 Thus, in these exaggeration cases, courts could turn to a multi-factor test rather than relying
on “too good to be true” language.
C. REVAMPING

THE

UNILATERAL MISTAKE DOCTRINE

When a mistake raises a potential TGTBT issue, this Article generally
recommends that the court use the unilateral mistake doctrine. But
choosing and applying a satisfactory, definitive test for the unilateral mistake doctrine can be challenging. In 1992, one commentator wrote, “Almost nobody, these days, understands how cases of unilateral mistake
ought to be decided—or why.”301 Perhaps this confusion contributes to
courts occasionally choosing a quick solution with a single-step TGTBT
test.
A very straightforward fact pattern and its unsatisfactory resolution
help demonstrate the level of confusion. Bryan Wrzesinski, a very knowledgeable twelve-year-old baseball card collector, visited “the Ball-Mart, a
newly opened baseball card store in Itasca, Illinois.”302 Wrzesinski asked
an inexperienced sales clerk the price of a 1968 Nolan Ryan/Jerry Koosman rookie baseball card.303 The inexperienced sales clerk interpreted
the marked price of “1200/” to mean $12.00 and accepted that amount in
exchange for the card.”304 Subsequently, the proprietor of the Ball-Mart
told Wrzesinski that the price was $1,200, which was “a price in line with
the market value,” but “Wrzesinski refused to reverse the transaction.”305
The parties went to court to resolve the matter, but the parties announced
that the card would be sold at auction and the proceeds given to charity
before the court could make a ruling.306
298. See, e.g., Kolodziej v. Mason, 774 F.3d 736, 739 (11th Cir. 2014) (explaining that a
law student tried to accept a defense lawyer’s televised exaggeration that he’d give a million dollars to anyone who could prove the prosecution’s theory).
299. “This list is not exclusive, and neither a single factor, nor a tallying of factors,
would be determinative.” Drennan, supra note 277, at 593. The five factors are: (i) the
speaker was trying to express an emotion—which could be anything from empathy and
camaraderie, all the way to frustration and rage—rather than convey accurate information;
(ii) the proposal includes inappropriate amounts, or unnecessary, impractical, or impossible terms; (iii) the course of dealing and other history between the parties suggests exaggeration; (iv) the speaker uses round numbers; and (v) the speaker may (or may not) have
repeated the promissory language. See id. at 594–600.
300. Kolodziej, 774 F.3d at 744.
301. Andrew Kull, Unilateral Mistake: The Baseball Card Case, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 57, 57
(1992).
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
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It seems that the card shop proprietor had the stronger case—he would
suffer material loss without rescission, Wrzesinski could be returned to
status quo ante with twelve dollars, and Wrzesinski clearly knew, or had
reason to know, about the mistake.307 Indeed the case is strikingly similar
to DePrince v. Starboard Cruise Services, Inc. (decided twenty-four years
later) in which an expert also tried to take advantage of an inexperienced
salesperson unable to understand the language of the trade.308 In
DePrince, the court applied Florida’s unilateral mistake doctrine and concluded the expert could not take advantage of the mistake.309
Even the experts in the field cannot agree on a precise list of the necessary elements to satisfy the unilateral mistake doctrine.310 A leading commentator writes, “Today avoidance is generally allowed . . . if two
conditions concur: 1) enforcement of the contract against the mistaken
party would be oppressive . . . and 2) avoidance would impose no substantial hardship on the [nonmistaken party], other than loss of bargain.”311 But the same commentator then discusses that the outcome of a
case could turn on a number of factors, such as: whether the mistake was
substantial; whether the mistake was a miscalculation or clerical error, as
opposed to an error in judgment; whether the mistake was of law or fact;
and whether “the mistaken party had easy access to the information
about which he or she was mistaken.”312
In contrast, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that three
elements must be satisfied,313 along with one of three additional elements.314 This effectively suggests three different avenues for relief because of unilateral mistake.
Even within a jurisdiction, there can be great uncertainty about the test
for unilateral mistake: “To suppose that there has been uniformity of
statement and action by the courts of any jurisdiction [regarding mis307. See supra notes 99–105 and accompanying text (listing possible elements for a unilateral mistake excuse).
308. DePrince v. Starboard Cruise Servs., Inc., 271 So. 3d 11, 13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2018) (en banc).
309. Id. But see Sheldon v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 284, No. A10-1186, 2011 WL 1236167,
at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2011) (“A lack of effective communication among [the mistaken party’s] agents is not a unilateral mistake.”).
310. See, e.g., DePrince, 271 So. 3d at 20–21 (citing State Bd. of Control v. Clutter Constr. Corp., 139 So. 2d 153, 156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (discussing the different standards
in four different Florida districts); Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Love, 732 So. 2d 456, 457 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Garvin v. Tidwell, 126 So. 3d 1224, 1228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012);
Flynt v. Progressive Consumers Ins. Co., 980 So. 2d 1217, 1219 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)).
311. PERILLO, supra note 18, at 335; see also MURRAY, supra note 22, § 28.39, at 224
(using the same language, but omitting the phrase “other than loss of bargain”).
312. PERILLO, supra note 18, at 336–37.
313. Under the Restatement, the elements that must always be met are (i) the mistake
involved a basic assumption of the contract; (ii) the mistake must have a material effect on
the exchange; and (iii) the mistaken party did not bear the risk of loss. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
314. The mistaken party must prove either (i) enforcement of the contract would be
unconscionable; or (ii) the other party had reason to know about the mistake; or (iii) the
nonmistaken party’s “fault caused the mistake.” Id.
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takes] would be to make a serious mistake.”315 For example, in 2013, a
Minnesota court stated that Minnesota cases “are not consistent” and discussed at least four other tests.316 Also, in 2015, a Florida court found
support for three different unilateral mistake tests in the Florida precedents.317 The court referred to a two-prong test, a three-prong test, and a
four-prong test.318 The court eventually settled on the four-prong test.319
But three years later, the same court eliminated one of the elements320
and emphasized that when reviewing precedents, “a court’s holding can
only go so far as its facts . . . .”321
A leading commentator warns against “dogmatic generalization” on
what courts have done or will do regarding mistakes.322 He asserts, “It is
without question that in any treatise or Restatement many such serious
mistakes are made.”323 Accordingly, he concludes, “We can
only . . . appeal[ ] to courts and lawyers to realize that these generalizations must be tentative . . . as new cases arise to test their capacity to
satisfy our changing notions of justice and human welfare.”324
One thing all the approaches have in common is that the mistaken
party must satisfy every element of the relevant test.325 This inflexibility
can lead to disturbing and unpredictable results. For example, in
DePrince v. Starboard Cruise Services, Inc.,326 the Florida court held that
Starboard Cruise Services was not entitled to summary judgment under
the unilateral mistake doctrine, in part, because there was no evidence
that the nonmistaken party induced the mistake.327 However, three years
later, the court eliminated the inducement requirement from the Florida
test and held for Starboard Cruise Services.328
Although a thorough analysis of the unilateral mistake doctrine is beyond the scope of this Article, one possible response would be to switch
to a multi-factor test in which no one factor is determinative. This would
allow courts to balance all the relevant circumstances. Also, this might
315. MURRAY, supra note 22, § 4.9, at 780.
316. Dixon v. Progressive Preferred Ins., No. A12-2183, 2013 WL 2928121, at *2–3
(Minn. Ct. App. 2013).
317. DePrince v. Starboard Cruise Servs., Inc., 163 So. 2d 586, 591 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2015).
318. Id. at 591–94.
319. Id. at 594 (“[T]his court currently adheres to the four-prong test.”).
320. DePrince v. Starboard Cruise Servs., Inc., 271 So. 3d 11, 20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2018) (en banc).
321. Id. at 18.
322. MURRAY, supra note 22, § 4.9, at 780.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. The Restatement requires satisfaction of three elements but then requires satisfaction of only one element more from a list of three additional elements. See supra notes
313–314 and accompanying text.
326. 163 So.3d 586 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
327. Id. at 592; see also DePrince v. Starboard Cruise Servs., Inc., 271 So. 3d 11, 14 (en
banc) (“The court concluded there was a genuine issue of material fact on the inducement
prong.”).
328. Id. at 20 (concluding that “inducement is not an element.”).
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allow courts to rely more heavily on decisions from other jurisdictions
(because the approaches may become more uniform). This might more
closely match what courts actually do in these situations. In both the en
banc DePrince329 case and the Dixon330 case, it appears that the courts
shaped the unilateral mistake test to achieve the desired result in the particular case. Commentators have noted concerns “that the practice of distorting . . . doctrinal rules to police for unfairness . . . produce[s]
confusion and unpredictability” and “‘covert tools are never reliable
tools.’”331 A more consistent approach might lead to more predictable
outcomes.
V. CONCLUSION
Everybody makes mistakes.332 Deciding the contractual consequences
of a mistake can be complicated, challenging work.333 It is understandable that a twelve-year-old would take the extreme position that a deal is
always a deal regardless of the hardship on the mistaken party and the
windfall to the nonmistaken party.334 Such a position might lead parties
to take uneconomical measures striving for perfection.335 And at the
other extreme, some might say that any bargain involving a mistake fails
to represent the parties’ true intent and should be unenforceable. Widespread acceptance of that extreme view could erode—if not destroy—
confidence that courts will enforce contracts.336
A more mature approach recognizes that, depending on the circumstances, valid arguments can be made on both sides.337 Sometimes a party
should be able to profit from another’s mistake, as when one party has
diligently researched the details, while the other party has been careless,
329. See generally id.
330. See generally Dixon v. Progressive Preferred Ins., No. A12-2183, 2013 WL 2928121
(Minn. Ct. App. 2013).
331. KNAPP, CRYSTAL & PRINCE, supra note 16, at 649–50 (quoting Karl Llewellyn,
Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 703 (1939)). As an example of saying one thing and
meaning another, a leading commentator states, after reviewing unilateral mistake cases,
“‘Reason to know’ [in these cases, really] means that the mistake, though unilateral, makes
enforcement unjust.” MURRAY, supra note 22, § 28.41, at 260.
332. MURRAY, supra note 22, § 28.39, at 224; id. § 4.9, at 779 (“To err is indeed
human.”); Eisenberg, supra note 223, at 1425 (“[E]very once in a while, [things go] awry.”).
333. MURRAY, supra note 22, § 4.9, at 613 (“The subject of mistake is one of the most
difficult in the law.”), quoted in Milligan v. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co., No. 12-CV-947-WDS,
2013 WL 6631783, at *5 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 16. 2013).
334. See supra notes 302–306 and accompanying text (regarding the baseball card case
involving the twelve-year-old boy).
335. See Market Street Assocs. L.P. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1991) (discussing “costly defensive expenditures”).
336. PERILLO, supra note 18, § 9.27, at 335–36; see also MURRAY, supra note 22, § 4.9,
at 779 (“It would be a very damaging mistake to suppose that we know just what to do and
say as to every mistake, or that we can lay down safe and easy rules and generalizations
based upon judicial experience.”).
337. PERILLO, supra note 18, § 9.25, at 328 (“Nowhere in the law of contracts do objective elements supporting the certainty and stability of transactions and subjective elements
supporting fairness . . . clash as frequently as here.”).
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reckless, or made a poor judgment.338 On the other hand, Judge Posner
has compared some who take advantage of another party’s mistake with
thieves.339 “Both judicial and extra-judicial experience shows that at
times we are . . . held responsible[ ] for our mistakes, while at other times
we are forgiven.”340
Courts may be tempted to take the easy way out and decide mistake
cases with a single-step TGTBT test. But courts should resist that temptation; it suggests that contract enforcement turns on mere caprice and that
confidence in the system would be misplaced. This Article organizes the
TGTBT cases and demonstrates that those cases could have been decided
through carefully structured multi-part tests that consider the conflicting
policy objectives. It also recommends a more flexible—and hopefully
more reasonable and predictable—method for applying the unilateral
mistake doctrine.

338. See Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat) 178, 183–84 (1817) (regarding a tobacco
buyer taking advantage of his knowledge that the Treaty of Ghent had been signed ending
the War of 1812 with Great Britain).
339. Market Street Assocs., 941 F.2d at 594 (“[Taking] deliberate advantage of an oversight by your contract partner . . . is sharp dealing. Like theft, it has no social product . . . .”
(citing Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in
Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 393 (1980)).
340. MURRAY, supra note 22, § 4.9, at 779.
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